Asserting Confidentiality: The Need for a Lay Representative-Claimant Privilege by Kaufman, Jennifer Brodkey
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 4
1-1-1984
Asserting Confidentiality: The Need for a Lay
Representative-Claimant Privilege
Jennifer Brodkey Kaufman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jennifer B. Kaufman, Asserting Confidentiality: The Need for a Lay Representative-Claimant Privilege, 15 Pac. L. J. 245 (1984).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol15/iss2/4
Comments
Asserting Confidentiality: The Need for
a Lay Representative-Claimant Privilege
Individuals appearing in California administrative hearings have been
given the statutory right to representation by counsel or other agents'
in a variety of settings, including hearings for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children,2 (hereinafter referred to as AFDC), unemploy-
ment insurance,3 workers' compensation,4 and the Agricultural Labor
Relations Board.' If an individual chooses attorney representation,
an attorney-client privilege 6 attaches to all confidential communications
7
between the parties.' If, however, a claimant elects nonattorney
representation, no provision of the California Evidence Code confers
a comparable privilege. 9 Nevertheless, in certain situations, courts have
recognized a lay representative-claimant privilege. Some jurisdictions
have extended the attorney-client privilege to encompass patent agents
1. For example, claimants may be represented by a relative, friend or individual from
a community service agency. See, e.g., Welfare Rights Organization v. Crisan, 33 Cal. 3d 766,
661 P.2d 1073, 190 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1983). See also 45 C.F.R. §205.10(a)(3)(iii) (in hearings
for public assistance, claimants "may be represented by an authorized representative such as
legal counsel, relative, friend or other spokesman," or may choose self representation).
2. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §10950. Providing in relevant part: "If any applicant for
or recipient of public social services is dissatisfied with any action of the county department
relating to his application for or receipt of public social services, if his application is not acted
upon with reasonable promptness, or if any person who desires to apply for public social ser-
vices is refused the opportunity to submit a signed application therefor, and is dissatisfied with
such refusal, he shall, in person or through an authorized representative . . . be accorded
an opportunity for a fair hearing." Id.
3. CA. UaNMP. INS. CODE §1957 ("Any individual claiming benefits in any proceedings
before the Appeals Board or its authorized representative may be represented by counsel or
agent . . .").
4. CAL. LAE. CODE §5700 ("Either party may be present at any hearing, in person,
by attorney, or by any other agent . . .").
5. Id. §1151.3. "Any party shall have the right to appear at any hearing in person, by
counsel, or by other representative." Id. The right to lay representation also attaches in federal
administrative hearings. See, e.g. 5 U.S.C. §555(b); 45 C.F.R. §205.10.
6. See generally, CAL. EVm. CODE §§950-962 (scope of lawyer-client privilege).
7. Id. §952 (definition of confidential communication).
8. See id. §954.
9. See id. §§910-1060.
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and their clients.'0 Another approach is exemplified by Welfare Rights
Organization v. Crisan." In that case, the California Supreme Court
found that a privilege for AFDC lay representatives was impliedly
guaranteed by the statute authorizing lay representation."2 Since the
holding of Crisan was limited to welfare hearings and did not extend
beyond statutory interpretation,' 3 whether a privilege currently exists
to protect lay representative-claimant communications in other areas
is unclear. The purpose of this comment is to establish a basis for
finding a privilege when the claimant elects lay representation.
This comment will review the areas in which lay representatives are
authorized, focusing primarily on workers' compensation and
unemployment insurance hearings.' 4 Following this discussion, the ra-
tionale behind the attorney-client privilege will be studied, together
with the reasons for extending a comparable privilege to lay represen-
tatives. The analysis will then focus on the patent agent and Crisan
cases to explore their applicability to workers' compensation and
unemployment insurance hearings. A court may choose not to follow
the precedent of Crisan by determining that the financial need of a
claimant in an AFDC hearing distinguishes Crisan from other situa-
tions in which lay representation is authorized. This comment will
demonstrate that a lay representative-claimant privilege may be com-
pelled by constitutional considerations through a discussion of the
federal constitutional requirements of due process and equal protec-
tion and the California constitutional right to privacy. Finally, legisla-
tion will be proposed to clarify the parameters of this privilege. First,
however, the proceedings in which lay representation is authorized
must be examined.
A. Proceedings in which Lay Representation is Authorized
Lay representation has been legislatively authorized in a variety of
administrative proceedings, including workers' compensation" and
10. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 391-94 (D.D.C. 1978); Jack Winter,
Inc. v. Koratron Co., Inc., 54 R.F.D. 44, 48 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Venitron Medical Prod., Inc.
v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. 324, 325-26 (D. N.J. 1975); In re Yarn Processing Patent
Litig., 177 U.S.P.Q. 514, 514 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
11. 33 Cal. 3d 766, 661 P.2d 1073, 190 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1983).
12. Id. at 771, 661 P.2d at 1077, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
13. Id. at 772, 661 P.2d at 1077, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
14. This comment will not address the issue of a lay representative-claimant privilege in
the public social services area. See generally Siporin, The Least Best Hope of Legal Services
for the Poor in the Eighties: The Need for Public Sector Lay Advocates with Confidential
Communications, 10 SAN FEN. V.L. REv. 21 (1982) (discussion of the constitutional basis for
a privilege for AFDC representatives and claimants).
15. CAL. LAB. CODE §5700.
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unemployment insurance hearings. 6 Workers' compensation is awarded
to an employee injured in the course of employment, irrespective of
fault.' 7 The benefits are not intended to compensate a worker fully
for the injuries sustained, but to rehabilitate the employee"8 and pro-
vide "reasonable subsistance" to the injured worker.' 9 Another social
insurance program, unemployment insurance, provides benefits to in-
dividuals who have become unemployed "through no fault of their
own." 20 The goal of this program is to give relief to unemployed
workers and to reduce the financial burden on society.2'
The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board and the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Appeals Board are empowered to hear issues relating
to the award or denial of benefits. 22 At these hearings, testimony may
be taken and witnesses examined by the parties to the proceedings.2 3
The claimant is permitted to appear alone, with counsel, or with an
authorized lay representative.24 No qualifications are prescribed for
a lay representative.25
The rationale for lay representation is grounded in public policy. 26
Many claimants are indigent and cannot afford to hire legal counsel. 27
Furthermore, claims are often small and therefore, do not justify the
16. CAL. UNEMP. INs. CODE §1957.
17. CAL. LAB. CODE §3600; see also, CAL. CoNsT., art. XIV, §4; 2 W. HANNA, CALIFOR-
NIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §1.051] (1983).
18. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 17, §1.05[3].
19. Id. §1.05[5][a].
20. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §100.
21. Id.; see California Portland Cement Co. v. California Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd., 178
Cal. App. 2d 263, 269-70, 3 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1960).
22. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§5300-5317; CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§401-413.
23. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§5700-5710; CAL. UNEMP. INs. CODE §§1951-1959. Administrative
hearings operate under relaxed rules of evidence and procedure. See generally O'BRImN, CAIUoR-
Nu EMPLoYER-EMPLoYEE BErEFrrs HANDBOOK, 273-80 (1981) (hearings procedures for unemploy-
ment compensation); I W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION, §§4.01-5.09 (1983) (hearing procedures for workers' compensation).
24. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§1151.3 (ALRB), 5700 (workers' compensation); CAL.
UNEMP. INs. CODE §1957 (unemployment compensation); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §10950
(public social services). An unrepresented claimant is aided by the hearing examiner, who sees
that all relevant information is brought out. See Coyle v. Gardner, 298 F. Supp. 609, 611-12
(D. Hawaii 1969).
25. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§1151.3, 5700; CAL. UNEMP. INs. CODE §1957; CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §10950. Some commentators believe that it is not necessary to be an attorney to
represent a claimant's interests adequately. See Morris, On Appeal: Claimant Advocacy and
Full and Fair Hearing, in 3 UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION STUDIES AND RESEARCH, 665, 667(U.S. Nat'l Comm'n. on Unempl. Comp. 1980); Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly:
A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L.R.
1, 79 (1981). No evidence has been presented that lay representatives have performed poorly
in these hearings. Id.
26. See Eagle Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 217 Cal. 244, 249, 18 P.2d
341, 343 (1933).
27. See id.
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use of an attorney.2" Due to these financial constraints, many claimants
would not be represented in administrative hearings if lay representa-
tion were not available.29 By permitting lay representation, the California
Legislature has provided an inexpensive means of fairly resolving
disputes.30
Despite these advantages, two basic arguments against lay represen-
tation have been raised. First is the concern that lay representation
will result in inexpert advice being given to a claimant due to lack
of control over the representative's qualifications.3 Representation by
an attorney in these areas, however, is not a guarantee of effective
counsel, particularly if the issues are complex.32 Second, the growth
of workers' compensation as a certified legal specialty has minimized
the need for lay representation in this field.3" While finding a qualified
attorney to represent a claimant in a workers' compensation hearing
is no longer difficult, financial considerations for the claimant remain.34
Notwithstanding these arguments, the statutory provisions for lay
representation appear to be firmly established.35 If a representative
is to serve a claimant effectively, however, a privilege should attach
to all confidential communications between the parties, much like the
recognized attorney-client privilege. To provide a better understand-
ing of the need for a privilege, the following section will examine
the attorney-client privilege.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
An attorney serves three basic functions: advising clients, drafting
28. See id. Attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases usually range from 9-12% of
the award, depending on the complexity of the case. In 1975, the average fee allowed was
$482. 1 W. HANNA, supra note 23, §§16.03 (1)-(2); see also Bancroft, Some Procedural Aspects
of the California Workmen's Compensation Law, 40 CA. L.R. 378, 396-97 (1952); Morris,
supra note 25, at 665-66.
29. See Morris, supra note 25, at 665-66. The lack of claimant representation often con-
tributes to the denial of benefits. Id.
30. See CAL. CONsT. art. Xiv, §4 (workers' compensation administration "shall accomplish
substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively and without incumberance . . .");
see also Hustedt v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 30 Cal. 3d 329, 351, 636 P.2d 1139, 1152,
178 Cal. Rptr. 801, 814 (1981) (Newman, J., concurring and dissenting). The change in language
in Welf. & Inst. Code section 10950 from "counsel" to "authorized representative" indicates the
awareness of the Legislature of the need for lay representation. Crisan, 33 Cal. 3d at 770,
661 P.2d at 1076, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
31. See Bland v. Reed, 261 Cal. App. 2d 445, 449, 67 Cal. Rptr. 859, 862 (1968); Eagle,
217 Cal. at 249, 18 P.2d at 343.
32. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 25, at 666.
33. See Hustedt, 30 Cal. 3d at 352, 636 P.2d at 1153, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 815 (Newman,
J., concurring and dissenting); 1 W. HANNA, supra note 23, at §16.01(1).
34. See 1 W. HANNA, supra note 23, at §§16.03(l)-(2).
35. The change in language from "counsel" to "authorized representative" in Welfare
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legal instruments, and advocating for a client.16 To permit full
disclosure of information and thereby improve the quality of services
rendered by an attorney,37 a privilege has been granted to clients3"
protecting confidential communications 39 made in the course of the
attorney-client relationship."0 As the United States Supreme Court
stated in Upjohn Co. v. United States," the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege is to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the obser-
vance of law and the administration of justice. The privilege
recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends
and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer being
fully informed by the client.42
Without this privilege, a client is less likely to confide freely in an
attorney, thereby impeding the attorney's functions.43 The attorney-
client privilege, however, does not act as a complete bar to obtaining
information; rather, it limits the permissible means of learning the
contents of the communication.44
Under the California Evidence Code, the client, as holder of the
privilege,45 may refuse to disclose or prevent another from disclosing
& Institutional Code section 10950 is indicative of this position. See Crisan, 33 Cal. 3d. at
770, 661 P.2d at 1076, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
36. 1 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORIuA PROCEDURE §3 (2d ed. 1970).
37. Sullivan v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 64, 69, 105 Cal. Rptr. 241, 244 (1972);
Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d
41, 53-54, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 489 (1968); Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 1061, 1061 (1978); Saltzburg, Communications Falling Within
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 IowA L. REv. 811, 816-17 (1981); 7 CAL. L. REv. COmi'N.,
§950 at 170 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as CoMUnssioN].
38. CAL. EviD. CODE §951(b) (definition of client).
39. Id. §952 (definition of confidential communication).
40. Id. §954 (lawyer-client privilege); id. §950 (definition of lawyer). These policy considera-
tions have been deemed to outweigh the risk of suppressing relevant evidence. See City and
County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 235, 231 P.2d 26, 30 (1951).
Furthermore, public policy has favored fostering attorney-client communications even before
the enactment of statutory provisions. See, e.g., People v. Atkinson, 40 Cal. 284, 285 (1870).
See also People v. Flores, 71 Cal. App. 3d 559, 565, 139 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549 (1977). The
payment of a fee and an employment relationship are not prerequisites to invoking the privilege.
Maier v. Noonan, 174 Cal. App. 2d 260, 266, 344 P.2d 373, 377 (1959); Benge v. Superior
Ct., 131 Cal. App. 3d 336, 345, 182 Cal. Rptr. 275, 280 (1982). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE,
EvIDENCE §2291 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (policy of the attorney-client privilege).
41. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
42. Id. at 389.
43. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Gonzales v. Municipal Court,
67 Cal. App. 3d 111, 118, 136 Cal. Rptr. 475, 479 (1977); Saltzburg, supra note 37, at 817.
44. See Saltzburg, supra note 37, at 818. Only the statements made to an attorney are
protected; independent investigation and questioning of a client are legitimate means of discovering
protected information. Id.
45. CAL. EviD. CODE §953.
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a confidential communication made to an attorney." Once the privilege
is claimed on the grounds of confidentiality, the communication is
presumed to have been made in confidence and the burden of proof
shifts to the person seeking disclosure.4 7 While these provisions apply
in administrative hearings as well as law courts," the attorney-client
privilege attaches only if the client has confided in an attorney, or
someone whom the client reasonably believed to be an attorney.4 9
Although a lay representative in an administrative hearing performs
the functions of an attorney, no privilege attaches to communications
between the representative and the client. The same policy considera-
tions favoring an attorney-client privilege mandate a comparable
privilege for lay representatives and their clients.5 0
C. Extending the Attorney-Client Privilege to Lay Representatives
The California Evidence Code explicitly limits privileges to those
provided by statute.5 This statutory prohibition prevents courts from
expanding evidentiary privileges as a matter of judicial policy.5 2 Some
courts have narrowly construed the attorney-client privilege to limit
the suppression of relevant evidence that necessarily results from in-
voking the privilege." Other courts, seeking to further the attorney-
client relationship, have construed the privilege more broadly.5 4 An
argument might be raised that lay representatives should be included
within the scope of the attorney-client privilege because the represen-
46. Id. §954. Communications from an attorney made to the client in the course of the
attorney-client relationship are also privileged. Id. §952. This privilege, however, is subject to
certain exceptions. See id. §§956 (attorney's services sought for the purpose of planning or
committing a crime or fraud), 957 (parties claiming through deceased client), 958 (communica-
tion relevant to an issue of breach of duty arising out of attorney-client relationship), 959
(attorney as attesting witness), 960 (intent of deceased client concerning writing affecting prop-
erty interest), 961 (validity of writing by deceased client affecting property interest), 962 (joint
clients).
47. Id. §917; see Flores, 71 Cal. App. 3d at 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 548; Romo v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 71 Cal. App. 3d 909, 922, 139 Cal. Rptr. 787, 795 (1977) (refusing to alleviate
burden by ordering in camera examination to determine if privileged).
48. See CAL. Evm. CODE §910.
49. See id. §950.
50. See WIomoaR, supra note 40, at §2300a; see also Siporin, supra note 14, at 34 (argu-
ing for privilege for AFDC lay representatives and claimants).
51. CAL. Evm. CODE §911.
52. See id.; COMaSSION, supra note 37, §911, at 160; Dickerson v. Superior Court, 135
Cal. App. 3d 93, 99, 185 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1982); Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court,
15 Cal. 3d 652, 656, 542 P.2d 977, 978-79, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 554-55 (1975).
53. See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Ct., 56 Cal. 2d 355, 396, 364 P.2d 266, 288,
15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 112 (1961); San Francisco, 37 Cal. 2d at 234, 231 P.2d at 29-30; Gonzales,
67 Cal. App. 3d at 118, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 479; Merritt v. Superior Ct., 9 Cal. App. 3d 721,
730, 88 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342-43 (1970).
54. See, eg., Benge, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 344, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 279; Flores, 71 Cal.
App. 3d at 563, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
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tatives serve the same functions as attorneys in administrative hear-
ings. A similar expansion of the attorney-client privilege has occur-
red in some patent agent cases.
A registered patent agent is authorized to represent patent applicants
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office." In Sperry v. Florida5 6
the state of Florida attempted to prohibit the activities of patent agents.
The United States Supreme Court held that the state was preempted
from finding that patent agents who appeared before the U.S. Patent
Office were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 7 Some courts
later expanded the rights of patent applicants by including the patent
agent-client relationship within the scope of the attorney-client
privilege." The courts reasoned that patent agents are licensed to ap-
pear before the Patent Office only after proving their qualifications
to practice. Consequently, professional and ethical standards can be
insured.59 The attorney-client privilege was also extended to patent
agents and their clients in the decision of In re Ampicillin Antitrust
Litigation.6 In that case, the court stated as follows:
Congress, in creating the Patent Office, has expressly permitted both
patent attorneys and patent agents to practice before that office.
The registered patent agent is required to have a full and working
knowledge of the law of patents and is even regulated by the same
standards, including the Code of Professional Responsibility, as are
applied to attorneys in all courts. Thus, in appearance and fact, the
registered patent agent stands on the same footing as an attorney
in proceedings before the Patent Office. 6
Lay representatives in the public sector, however, are not subject
to any qualifying procedures. 2 While some organizations exist to pro-
vide assistance to claimants, particularly in the public social service
55. 37 C.F.R. §1.341.
56. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
57. See id. at 386-88.
58. See, e.g., Ampicillin, 81 F.R.D. at 393-94; Jack Winter, 54 F.R.D. at 48; Vernitron,
186 U.S.P.Q. at 324; Yarn Processing, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 514. But see Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975); Rayette-Faberge, Inc. v. John Oster Mfg.
Co., 47 F.R.D. 524 (E.D.Wis. 1969); Joh. A. Benckiser G.m.b.H., Chem. F. v. Hygrade Food
Prod. Corp., 253 F. Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1966); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950) (all holding that the attorney-client privilege does not extend
to individuals not admitted to the bar).
59. See Ampicillin, 81 F.R.D. at 391-94; Jack Winter, 54 F.R.D. at 48; Vernitron 186
U.S.P.Q. at 325-26; Yarn Processing, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 514; see also WiGMORE, supra note
40, at §2300a (discussing a professional privilege to encompass qualified practitioners).
60. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
61. Id. at 393.
62. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§1151.3, 5700; CAL. UNEMPL. IN s. CODE §1957; CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §10950.
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arena," a claimant may be represented by a friend or neighbor with
no expertise in a given area. Although the issue of qualifications has
become moot due to the statutory authorization of lay representation
in state administrative hearings, the lack of control over a lay represen-
tative's qualifications serves to distinguish this situation from the pa-
tent agent cases. The expansion of the attorney-client privilege to in-
clude claimants and lay representatives without prescribing qualifica-
tions for the representative, therefore, would be inappropriate."
Although the Evidence Code precludes courts from creating new
privileges,65 a basis for a lay representative-claimant privilege may be
found in the Crisan case. 66
D. Judicially Recognized Privilege: Welfare Rights
Organization v. Crisan
In Welfare Rights Organization v. Crisan, the court was confronted
with a lay representative from the Welfare Rights Organization. The
lay representative was subpoenaed by the Butte County Social Welfare
Department to testify concerning past communications with an AFDC
claimant. The claimants, representative, and organization filed an ac-
tion for injunctive and declaratory relief arguing that a privilege was
constitutionally required under the state and federal due process clauses.
Additionally, the claimants asserted that federal AFDC regulations
compelled recognition of a lay representative-claimant privilege, and
therefore that the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution
precluded the state from denying the existence of the privilege. The
trial court dismissed the complaint after ruling that no evidentiary
privilege existed to protect communications between claimants and
nonattorney representatives. The Court of Appeal affirmed the dis-
missal.67
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the judgment of
dismissal was reversed. 68 Although the court recognized the intent of
the Legislature to prevent judicially created privileges,69 the court found
that the privilege was impliedly provided by section 10950 of the
63. See Siporin, supra note 14, at 27-28; Livingston, Organizations and Administrative
Practice - A Balance to the Corporate State?, 26 HASTINcs L.J. 89, 101 (1974).
64. See WviemoR, supra note 40, at §2300a (proposing a privilege for lay representatives
only if certain qualifications are met).
65. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
66. welfare Rights Organization v. Crisan, 33 Cal. 3d 766, 661 P.2d 1073, 190 Cal. Rptr.
919 (1983).
67. Id. at 768, 661 P.2d at 1074, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
68. Id. at 772, 661 P.2d at 1077, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
69. Id. at 769, 661 P.2d at 1075, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
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Welfare & Institutions Code, the statute authorizing lay
representation.'0 After emphasizing the importance of the attorney-
client privilege, 7 the court concluded:
Suffice it to say that the considerations which support the privilege
are so generally accepted that the Legislature must have implied its
existence as an integral part of the right to representation by lay
persons. Otherwise that right would, in truth, be a trap by inducing
confidential communications and then allowing them to be used
against the claimant. We do not attribute such a sadistic intent to
the Legislature. 7-
The court did not decide the constitutional issues argued by the
plaintiffs." Furthermore, the court limited its holding to claimants
in public social service administrative hearings, which are based on
an individual's economic circumstance or social condition. 4
Justice Richardson, dissenting, argued that the court was precluded
from finding a lay representative-claimant privilege for two reasons.
First, he asserted that the privilege was a matter for legislative deter-
mination since the privilege is not specified in the Evidence Code."
Second, Justice Richardson found no constitutional basis to compel
judicial recognition of the privilege. 71 Consequently, the dissent con-
cluded, the failure to protect communications within the lay
representative-claimant relationship does not create an "unfairness of
constitutional dimensions."
7
The rationale of the majority in Crisan is also applicable to workers'
compensation and unemployment insurance hearings. As Justice
Broussard noted, the Legislature could not have intended that the
only sound advice a lay representative in these areas could offer was,
70. Id. at 772, 661 P.2d at 1077, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 923. The court also noted that the
claimants "believed and intended their consultation with him [their representative] in that capacity
to be confidential." Id. at 768, 661 P.2d at 1074, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
71. Id. at 770-71, 661 P.2d at 1076, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
72. Id. at 771, 661 P.2d at 1076-77, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23.
73. Id. at 772, 661 P.2d at 1077, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
74. Id.; see CAL. WELF. & CODE §10051 (definition of public social services).
75. Crisan, 33 Cal. 3d at 777, 661 P.2d at 1080-81, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 926-27 (Richardson,
J., dissenting). The dissent refused to follow the patent agent cases, distinguishing the qualification
guarantees in those cases. Id. at 775-76, 661 P.2d at 1080, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 926. The Evidence
Code has, in fact, been recently amended to expand the recognized privileges. In 1970, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege was amended to include clinical social workers and school
psychologists. CAL. Evi. CODE §1010(C), (d). In 1974, this privilege was further expanded to
include marriage, family and child counselors. Id. §1010(e). Finally, in 1980 a new privilege
was recognized for victims of sexual assault and their counselors. Id. §§1035-1036.2. The fact
that the Legislature has amended these provisions appears to support the dissent's position
in Crisan.
76. Crisan, 33 Cal. 3d at 776-77, 661 P.2d at 1080, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 926 (Richardson,
J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 777, 661 P.2d at 1080, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 926. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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"Don't talk to me." 78 A court, therefore, may follow the precedent
of Crisan and find a privilege impliedly guaranteed in statutes authoriz-
ing lay representation. Thus, a dichotomy becomes apparent between
the Crisan approach and the prohibition of the Evidence Code against
judicially created privileges." 9 By recognizing a privilege employing the
Crisan rationale, courts may be thwarting the intent of the Legislature.
Conversely, a court may distinguish the welfare setting of Crisan from
workers' compensation and unemployment insurance hearings and
refuse to find an impliedly guaranteed privilege. If, however, con-
stitutional grounds for a lay representative-claimant privilege exist,
another basis can be found for judicial recognition of the privilege.
This comment will next discuss due process, equal protection, and
right to privacy as constitutional grounds for establishing a lay
representative-claimant privilege.
E. Procedural Due Process
In Goldberg v. Kelly,80 appellants, recipients of benefits under AFDC
or a state Home Relief program, challenged the adequacy of benefit
termination proceedings. The appellants claimed that the failure to
provide for a personal appearance at a pretermination hearing, with
an opportunity to present evidence and examine witnesses, was a viola-
tion of the due process clause of the federal Constitution.8 The United
States Supreme Court, finding that the benefits were a statutory en-
titlement and therefore constituted a property interest," recognized
the right of a welfare recipient to an evidentiary hearing before the
termination of benefits.8 3 The extent of procedural due process protec-
tion that the Constitution requires is to be determined by the extent
of the loss suffered by the claimant.8 ' Therefore, although posttermina-
tion hearings may be sufficient in some cases,"s depriving individuals
of their means of existence mandates a pretermination hearing. 6 The
Court concluded that fundamental due process requires the oppor-
tunity to be heard in a meaningful and timely manner, tailored to
the capabilities of those to be heard.17 The right to confront and cross-
78. Id. at 771 n.3, 661 P.2d at 1077 n.3, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 923 n.3.
79. See CAL. Evi. CODE §911.
80. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
81. Id. at 259.
82. Id. at 262.
83. Id. at 267-68.
84. Id. at 262-63.
85. Id. at 263.
86. Id. at 264.
87. Id. at 267-69.
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examine witnesses is of paramount importance in a termination hear-
ing, since the continuation of benefits may depend on this testimony. 88
The claimant must also have an opportunity to present defenses and
arguments.8 9 As a result, the Court held that counsel need not be
provided to a claimant at public expense, although the claimant must
be permitted to retain counsel. 9° Without representation, the right to
be heard is virtually meaningless. 91
The pretermination hearing requirements of Goldberg subsequently
have been applied to the suspension92 and reduction of social service
benefits. 93 Workers' compensation and unemployment insurance
benefits are also considered property interests requiring pretermina-
tion hearings.94 Consequently, the right to be heard in a meaningful
manner should attach to a claimant choosing to appear with a lay
representative. The recognition of a lay representative-claimant privilege
is vitally important for this right to be fully exercised, particularly
if an attorney need not be appointed to assist the claimant in a hearing.
The extent of procedural due process required depends on the balanc-
ing of three factors enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge.9" In that case,
the respondent's social security disability insurance benefits were ter-
minated by the Social Security Administration. The respondent
challenged the termination procedure and asserted that his benefits
should be reinstated pending a hearing on the issue of his disability.
The Court, rejecting this argument, set forth the factors to determine
constitutional due process requirements. The factors to be weighed
are (1) the private interests of the claimant affected by the official
action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through
the procedures used and probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute safeguards, and (3) the governmental interests.9 6
1. Private interests of the claimant
One of the private interests that would be considered important
in determining the procedures required by due process is the finan-
cial interest of the claimant. In both Goldberg and Mathews, the claim-
88. Id. at 269.
89. Id. at 267-68.
90. Id. at 270.
91. Id.
92. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970) (benefits for the aged).
93. Comment, California Welfare Fair Hearings: An Adequate Remedy?. 15 U.C.D. L.
REv. 542, 579 (1972) (federal and state requirements).
94. See Staley v. California Unempl. Ins. Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. App. 3d 674, 678, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 294, 295 (1970); CAL. LAB. CODE §5803.
95. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
96. Id. at 335.
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ant had a financial interest in the uninterrupted receipt of benefits, 97
yet the Court came to different conclusions regarding the need for
a pretermination hearing. In Goldberg, the need for benefits was crucial
because welfare benefits, and therefore the basic necessities of life,
were at stake. 98 The Court in Mathews, however, viewed the termina-
tion of social security disability benefits as less important because those
benefits were not based on financial need. 99 If need became a factor
for a claimant due to the termination of the benefits, other govern-
ment programs were available to provide assistance. 10
Workers' compensation and unemployment insurance present a situa-
tion similar to Mathews in that benefits under both programs are paid
despite the financial circumstances of the recipients. Employees may
receive workers' compensation benefits for permanent injuries evbn
if they are working and receiving a salary.' While unemployment
insurance recipients by definition, are not receiving a salary, payment
is made even though the recipient has accumulated savings or other
sources of income. 0 2 The possibility is strong, therefore, that a court
would give relatively little weight to a claimant's financial interest
in deciding whether a lay representative-claimant privilege is required
under the due process clause.
A second interest is also at stake for the claimant, however: an
interest in adequate representation to prevent the wrongful termina-
tion of benefits. Through the presentation of issues and examination
of witnesses, counsel can protect a claimant's interests. 03 This in-
terest in adequate representation is adversely affected by the failure
to recognize a lay representative-claimant privilege, as the next sec-
tion will discuss.
2. Risk of erroneous deprivation of interests
If a claimant is not adequately represented in an administrative hear-
ing, the risk of erroneous deprivation is high.°'0 In Mathews, however,
97. See id. at 340; 397 U.S. at 264.
98. See 397 U.S. at 264.
99. See 424 U.S. at 340-43.
100. Id. at 342.
101. See, e.g., Department of Motor Vehicles v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n., 14 Cal. 2d 189,
191-92, 93 P.2d 131, 132 (1939). Temporary disability payments compensate for lost wages,
while permanent disability compensates for a theoretical loss of ability to compete in the labor
market. Russell v. Bankers Life Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 405, 415-16, 120 Cal. Rptr. 627, 633-34
(1975).
102. See CAL. UNEmp. INS. CODE §1253 (individual is eligible for benefits if unemployed,
available for work and appropriate claim is filed); see also id. §1252 (definition of unemployed).
103. 397 U.S. at 270-71.
104. See id.; see also Siporin, supra note 14, at 34 (citing studies that claimants who are
1984 / Lay Representative-Claimant Privilege
the Court found that a pretermination hearing was not constitutionally
required due to the nature of the evidence presented.' Much of the
evidence in social security disability hearings is comprised of medical
assessments and standard medical reports; 0 6 witness credibility is rarely
at issue. 0 7
In workers' compensation cases, medical reports also play a signifi-
cant role in determining the extent of disability. Other factors, however,
must also be proved, including that the injury arose out of and in
the course of employment." 8 Unlike the social security disability case
in Mathews, unemployment compensation cases rely heavily on witness
testimony."0 9 Effective presentation of a claimant's case, including
cross-examination of witnesses, is essential in administrative hearings.'"'
If communications between a claimant and a representative are in-
hibited, however, due to the lack of a privilege, effective representa-
tion becomes illusory."' The claimant's interest in effective represen-
tation thus appears to be an important interest which must be weighed
against the interests of the government in denying a lay representative-
claimant privilege. The government interests at stake are examined
in the following section.
3. Government Interests
The Court in Goldberg found that welfare payments enabled a reci-
pient to participate in the life of the community, thus preventing
dissatisfaction and unrest. 1 2 As a consequence, the government had
an important interest in granting pretermination hearings.' 13 The
government also has an important interest in effective representation
in workers' compensation and unemployment insurance cases because
denial of benefits will increase the burdens on society to care for the
injured and unemployed." 4
represented in administrative hearings are twice as successful in their claims as unrepresented
claimants) and Morris, supra note 25, at 665-66 (describing disadvantages of claimants in
unemployment insurance hearings).
105. See 424 U.S. at 343-44.
106. Id. at 343.
107. Id. at 344.
108. CAL. LAB. CODE §3600. "Arises out of employment" refers to the causal connection
of the injury to the employment, while "course of employment" refers to the necessary time
and place elements. See Artukovich v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 312,
322, 310 P.2d 461, 466-67 (1957).
109. See O'BEN, supra note 23, at 273-77.
110. See 397 U.S. at 269-70.
111. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text (rationale for attorney-client privilege).
112. 397 U.S. at 265.
113. Id. at 264-65.
114. Note, Workmen's Compensation Act: Practice of Law: Right of Laymen to Appear
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Conversely, the government has an interest in conserving its fiscal
and administrative resources. While this interest was not sufficient
to override the need for pretermination hearings in a welfare context,"II
the interest was given considerable weight by the Court in Mathews."6
The costs to the government resulting from the recognition of a lay
representive-claimant privilege, however, would be negligible. The only
government saving in denying this privilege is the cost of information
gathering: obtaining information from a claimant's representative is
less expensive than initiating a separate investigation. The manipula-
tion of a claimant's right to representation, however, is not a legitimate
means of saving resources.
The application of the foregoing Mathews factors suggests that the
risk of deprivation of the claimant's interests by failing to recognize
a lay representative-claimant privilege in workers' compensation and
unemployment insurance cases outweighs the benefit that the govern-
ment gains when the privilege does not exist. To insure that the claim-
ant's interest in adequate representation is protected, a lay
representative-claimant privilege appears to be required under the due
process clause." 7 Another area that may constitutionally compel a
lay representative-claimant privilege is the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution.' "'
F. Equal Protection
The equal protection clause of the federal Constitution mandates
that no person shall be denied equal protection of the law by the
government.' As a result, persons similarly situated must be treated
in a similar manner. 20 Under traditional analysis, heightened judicial
scrutiny will be applied to any classification made by the government
that distinguishes individuals on a suspect basis, such as race.' 2' If,
however, the classification is made on another basis, that classifica-
tion is constitutional only if rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment interest. 2 2 Claimants in administrative hearings, whether
Before Industrial Accident Commission in Representative Capacity, 22 CAxru. L. REv. 121, 123
(1934).
115. See 397 U.S. at 264-66.
116. See 424 U.S. at 347-48.
117. See also Siporin, supra note 14, at 32-37 (discussion of due process requirements for
a privilege for AFDC representatives).
118. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1.
119. Id.
120. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONsTruiioNAi LAw 586 (1983).
121. Id. at 592.
122. Id. at 591. See generally id. 590-99 (standards of review for equal protection analysis).
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represented by attorneys or lay representatives, are similarly situated.
By granting a privilege only to claimants appearing with attorneys
and denying the same protection to individuals choosing lay represen-
tation, a classification is made that must pass this rational basis test.
As discussed in the preceding section, the government has an in-
terest in permitting fair hearings. The government, however, also has
an interest in receiving all relevant information at these hearings. Any
privilege necessarily thwarts this interest." 3 Nonetheless, because
claimants are similarly situated, a distinction between claimants with
attorneys and those without in granting a privilege may not meet the
rational basis test.
The government may contend that the suppression of relevant
evidence is outweighed only if a claimant chooses attorney represen-
tation, thereby insuring that competent advice will be received. 2 The
fact that an attorney is a professional, however, does not guarantee
the quality of service to a client. 25 Furthermore, the attorney-client
privilege attaches to a nonattorney as well, if the client reasonably
believes the individual is authorized to practice law. 26 As a result,
a communication made to a lay representative with expertise in the
area is not privileged, while communication with a nonattorney, lacking
any qualifications, may be protected under existing statutory
provisions. 117
The attorney-client privilege was recognized to encourage open com-
munications between the parties and thereby improve the quality of
representation provided to a client. 28 Without this privilege, the func-
tion of an attorney is severely restricted. Similarly, lay representatives
cannot effectively represent claimants in an administrative hearing
without a privilege to protect their communications.' 29 The distinc-
tion between attorney and lay representative, therefore, appears to
be irrational. Consequently, the denial of a lay representative-claimant
privilege may violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the right to privacy as established in the California Con-
stitution may compel a lay representative-claimant privilege.
123. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
124. The state has a substantial interest in protecting claimants and administrative processes
from incompetent advocacy. Rhode, supra note 25, at 77.
125. See supra notes 25 and 31 and accompanying text.
126. CAL. EviD. CODE §950.
127. See, e.g., People v. Barker, 27 N.W. 539, 546 (1886) (confession to detective posing
as attorney held privileged), see also WiGMopm, supra note 40, at §2302.
128. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
129. See id; WvIGMOR, supra note 40, at §2300a.
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G. Right to Privacy
In 1972, the California Constitution was amended to include privacy
as an inalienable right.13 This provision was enacted in response to
the encroachment on personal freedom stemming from increased
government surveillance and data collection. ' The drafters placed
particular emphasis on the gathering, retention, and improper use of
personal information collected about individuals.' 32 For example, in
White v. Davis,133 the California Supreme Court found that covert
police surveillance in classes at the University of California in Los
Angeles may have violated California privacy provisions. The court
characterized this action as 'governmental snooping' in the
extreme,"' 34 and went on to hold that because the information gathered
appeared to have been unrelated to any criminal activity, the gather-
ing of information may have been unconstitutional.' The court then
articulated the test to determine whether the right to privacy was
violated: to justify the collection of this information, the government
must show that a compelling state interest exists and no less intrusive
means for accomplishing that goal is available.'36
If no lay representative-claimant privilege is recognized, an ad-
ministrative agency has instant access to relevant information by merely
issuing a subpoena at any time to the representative. 3 7 As set forth
in White v. Davis, the state must establish a compelling interest to
rationalize this intrusion into a claimant's right to privacy. As discussed
above, cost savings are not sufficient to justify the denial of the
privilege. 31 On the other hand, the prevention of future fraudulent
activity on the part of claimants may be a compelling state interest.
The second prong of the test established in White must also be met,
however: that no less intrusive means exists to achieve the compelling
state interest. This portion of the test is failed by denying a lay
representative-claimant privilege because a less intrusive means is ap-
parent. The scope of the privilege can be limited, as in the attorney-
130. CAL. CONST. art. I, §1.
131. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774-75, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94,
105-06 (1975).
132. Id. The referendum election brochure emphasized that "fundamental to our privacy
is the ability to control the circulation of personal information" (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 774, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
133. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
134. Id. at 775-76, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
135. Id. at 776, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
136. Id. at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
137. This was attempted by the Butte County Social Welfare Department, leading to Welfare
Rights Organization v. Crisan, 33 Cal. 3d 766, 661 P.2d 1073, 190 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1983).
138. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
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client privilege, to exclude communications relating to future fraudulent
or criminal activities. 139 Since a less drastic means of achieving this
goal is available - legislation - a violation of the right to privacy
appears to exist."'0
H. Proposed Legislation
The above discussion has revealed that several possible constitu-
tional bases for recognizing a lay representative-claimant privilege may
exist. Procedural due process appears to mandate a privilege to pro-
tect a claimant's interest in adequate representation. Equal protec-
tion issues arise because claimants in administrative proceedings are
similarly situated, yet receive different degrees of protection depend-
ing on whether they appear with an attorney or a lay representative.
Finally, the California constitutional right to privacy may be violated
if the government is permitted access to information about benefit
recipients through their lay representatives.
If constitutional questions are at stake, the courts are free to develop
a privilege to protect a claimant's rights. Particular details of the
privilege, however, such as the scope of protected communications, may
give rise to a flood of litigation. To clarify the parameters of this
privilege, this comment proposes that legislation be enacted to amend
the Evidence Code to include a lay representative-claimant privilege.
CONCLUSION
This comment has demonstrated the need for a privilege to protect
communications between a lay representative and a claimant. Without
this protection, the claimant's freedom of selection in choosing a
representative is impaired because anything communicated to a lay
representative may later be subject to discovery.14 1
Although the California Supreme Court has found that a privilege
for an AFDC representative impliediy exists within the statute authoriz-
ing lay representation, the California Evidence Code precludes the
court from creating additional privileges. Future decisions may follow
Crisan and find a lay representative-claimant privilege impliedly
guaranteed in the authorizing legislation in other areas, such as
workers' compensation and unemployment insurance. In the absence
of decisions implying a privilege as the court did in Crisan, further
139. See CAL. EviD. CODE §956.
140. See also Siporin, supra note 14, at 46-48 (privacy considerations relating to privilege
for AFDC representatives).
141. See Ampicillin, 81 F.R.D. at 393.
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justification for this privilege can be found in federal due process
and equal protection requirements and the California constitutional
right to privacy.
Due process considerations may require that a lay representative-
claimant privilege be recognized. A lay representative, like an attorney,
cannot adequately represent a claimant if information is withheld by
the claimant due to fear of discovery by an adverse party. A privilege
insures that all confidential information will be protected. By weighing
the factors presented in Mathews v. Eldridge,'42 the author of this
comment concluded that the right of the claimant to adequate represen-
tation and the risk of deprivation of this interest appear to outweigh
the governmental interests involved. Consequently, an argument can
be made that the denial of this privilege constitutes a violation of
the due process clause.
Futhermore, a lay representative-claimant privilege may also be com-
pelled under the equal protection clause. Permitting a privilege to pro-
tect communications made to an attorney, but denying that same pro-
tection to communications made to a lay representative, falls to satisfy
the rational basis analysis required for nonsuspect classifications.
Finally, the lay representative-claimant privilege appears to be re-
quired under the privacy provisions of the California Constitution.
The accelerated encroachment on privacy through government data
collection gave rise to the constitutional amendment that incorporated
privacy as an inalienable right of California citizens. Without this
protection, an administrative agency has ready access to any relevant
information communicated by a claimant. To permit the government
to acquire information by subpoenaing lay representatives to disclose
information received from claimants appears to be a direct violation
of the California Constitution.
Although the author has suggested that courts have a constitutional
basis in which to find a lay representative-claimant privilege, the argu-
ment has been made that legislation is required to clarify the details
of the privilege. The addition of this privilege to the California
Evidence Code would fortify the interests of claimants in a fair hearing.
Jennifer Brodkey Kaufman
142. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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APPENDIX
PRoPosED LAY REPRESENTAME-CLAIMANT PRIVLEGE
FOR THE CAIFoRNA EVIDENC E CODE
1. As used in this article, "lay representative" means a nonat-
torney selected by a claimant to represent the claimant in an ad-
ministrative hearing as authorized by statute.
2. As used in this article, "claimant" means a person appearing
in an administrative hearing who consults a lay representative for the
purpose of representation as authorized by statute.
3. As used in this article, "confidential communication between
lay representative and claimant" means information, transmitted be-
tween a claimant and a lay representative in the course of that rela-
tionship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the claimant
is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than those
who are present to further the interest of the claimant in the con-
sultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the pur-
pose for which the lay representative is consulted, and includes an
opinion formed and the advice given by the lay representative in the
course of that relationship.
4. As used in this article, "holder of the privilege" means the
claimant or the claimant's guardian or conservator.
5. Subject to Section 912 and except as otherwise provided in this
article, the claimant has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to pre-
vent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between
claimant and lay representative if the privilege is claimed by:
(a) the holder of the privilege;
(b) a person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder
of the privilege; or
(c) the person who was the lay representative at the time of the
confidential communication, but this person may not claim the privilege
if no holder of the privilege exists or if otherwise instructed by a
person authorized to permit disclosure.
6. The lay representative who received or made a communication
subject to the privilege under this article shall claim the privilege
whenever the representative is present when the communication is
sought to be disclosed and is authorized to claim the privilege under
subdivision (c) of Section 5.
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7. No privilege exists under this article if the services of the lay
representative were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to
commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud.
8. No privilege exists under this article as to a communication
relevant to an issue of breach, by the lay representative or by the
claimant, of a duty arising out of the lay representative-claimant
relationship.
9. No privilege exists under this article as to a communication
relevant to an issue concerning the intention or competence of a clai-
mant executing an attested document of which the lay representative
is an attesting witness, or concerning the execution or attestation of
such a document.
